Societal Impacts of the Super Tuesday Tornado Outbreak of February 5-6, 2008

Julie Demuth* and Daniel Nietfeld**

*NCAR Societal Impacts Program
**NWS WFO Omaha/Valley, NE





The essentials!

- Partnerships among social scientist, research meteorologists, operational meteorologists, policy makers, practitioners, etc.
 - Daniel → links operational meteorologists, users
 - Julie → links users, social science research
 - All of us here in the room who have essential linkages
- Interest and willingness to work together, listen, learn, exchange ideas ... co-produce we get the state of the state of

NWS service assessments


- Conducted to evaluate NWS performance during significant, high-impact events
- Historically primarily inward, quantitative assessment of NWS and its partners
- 2008 shift toward including external, qualitative assessment of members of public
 - Super Tuesday, Mother's Day, Midwest floods






February 5-6, 2008, tornado outbreak

- 13 months ago today!
- Excellent long lead-time predictions from NWS
 - First outlook issued 6 days prior
 - Day 3, Day 2, Day 1 outlooks zeroed in with slight, moderate, high risk
 - Day 1 outlook mentioned "potentially strong and longtrack tornadoes"
 - Tornado watches in place with several hours lead time



Impacts of the tornado outbreak

- 87 tornadoes
 - 5 EF-4 tornadoes
 - 1 tornado had a 123-mile long path
- 57 fatalities
 - most sinceMay 31, 1985
 - 13th overall
- 350+ injuries
- \$520M damage



Ubiquitous questions

- This was a well-warned event, with good information, so...
 - Why did so many people die?
 - What questions do we have about what members of the public understand, think, do, want, ... etc.? How do we go about addressing these questions?
 - What could we (the weather community) do differently? Better?
 - How will continuously changing technology affect the how we analyze weather and communicate that information?

that information?
These are physical <u>and</u> social science
questions!

Integrating social science research

- The task To try to understand why so many people died and the details of those fatalities
 - Age, gender, warning received, warning source, warning heeded, shelter sought, structure where they died, availability of safer shelter
- they died, availability of safer shelter
 An opportunity To gather empirical information about people's actual warning response behaviors
 - What info people had, how they interpreted it (knowledge)
 - How people perceived the situation & info (perceptions)

Highly detiende pendent détentaire process

Methods and data

- Semi-structured interviews with the public; 41 interviews total by 3 sub-teams in the 6 WFOs
 - Kevin Barjenbruch → my essential other half in the field!
- Sampling: targeted, convenience, snowball

 Caveats: not generalizable, balance between scientific rigor and rapid operational needs. 1st



Some of the questions

- When did you first realize there was a threat of a tornado?
 - How did you learn about the threat? What were you thinking after you received that information? What did you do next?
- Have you ever been in a similar type of extremeweather situation in the past?
 - Did anything from that experience influence what you did during this event? Have you ever been warned about an extreme weather event in the past that did not occur?
- Think back over the entire tornado event, from the time you learned there was a tornado threat through when the tornado actually occurred.
 - Do you feel that any of the information you received was Suspend! Juthgram to the information you received was liked to have had?

 Learn!

Data analysis

- Analyzed iteratively, cooperatively by 2 coders
- Coded with Excel
 - Pre-determined categories
 - Categories created inductively during analysis
- Caveats and considerations!!
 - Not generalizable
 - Balance between scientific rigor and rapid operational needs
 - Paraphrasing vs. verbatim quotes
 - First step, hopefully leading to more related work in the future (more detailed analysis, in-depth studies, studies in various weather contexts)

Findings: People's knowledge

- People get information from multiple sources, multiple times
 - Majority via television
 - Also commonly from other people (family, friends, neighbors, co-workers)
- Tornado sirens are useful, but...
 - Misconceptions about sirens as a warning device
 - Misconceptions about what sirens mean

Julie's thoughts and questions

- Things I've learned
 - Communication → pre-event conference calls,
 NWS chat for before and during an event
 - Siren policies that varying widely by city, county
 - NWS, emergency managers, broadcasters handle tons of info
- Things I wonder and want to explore
 - How do the different actors NWS forecasters, broadcasters, emergency managers — in the information chain perceive their roles and the roles of others?
 - Does this affect what info they convey? How?
 - How can we use technological advances effectively in conveying forecast and warning information?

Daniel's thoughts and questions (I have hundreds!)

- Things I've learned
 - We all seem to have assumptions of our individual roles as team members
 - We are governed by policy and by software
 - Creativity must look beyond policy and software ... change is a <u>process!</u>
- Things I wonder and want to explore
 - Does the "public" trust their source of warning information?
 - Do people know where their warning information originates? Do they care?
 - Is there such thing as too long of lead time?

Findings: People's perceptions of the time of year of the outbreak

- People integrate multiple pieces of information —seasonality, weather salience, situational awareness about the event
 - Majority of people associate tornado outbreaks as occurring in March or later...
 - ... so some minimized threat because they perceived it as being outside "traditional" tornado season
 - BUT, for many people, situational factors (e.g., unusually warm weather) heightened their awareness

Findings: People's personalization of the threat to them

- People often seek confirmation of the threat; a single source of info will not necessary spur protective action
 - Atkins, AR, woman
- Many people recognize a risk exists, but believe that their personal risk is less or that they aren't at risk at all (optimism bias)
 - Hardin County, TN, family
 - Arkansas family

Julie's thoughts and questions

Things I've learned

- NWS, broadcasters, emergency managers work to make every situation salient, unique
- NWS can and does tailor their warnings and callto-action statements
- Broadcasters' visuals can help people personalize risks

Things I wonder and want to explore


- Should NWS, broadcasters, EMs, others assume people will seek confirmation?
- Should what we communicate change according to the urgency of the threat? How can we do this effectively?
- What different levels of protective action do people take, when, and why (response efficacy)?

Daniel's thoughts and questions


- Things I've learned
 - Some (many?) of us assume that people will learn about the warning and take <u>immediate</u> protective action
 - We want better ways to convey urgent information... ("tornado emergency", "face certain death...")
- Things I wonder and want to explore
 - What else can we tell them that would make a difference?
 - How beneficial would it be to have GIS data in our warnings ...for the forecasters? (e.g., WFO Dallas/Fort Worth) ...for the users?
 - Should this be our job??

Example of facilities within the Arkansas tornado warnings





forecasters issue more effective warnings?





NULL

What about Scout Camps?



People's decision-making

- Decision-making is NOT a singular event ... it happens numerous times and ways
 - Part of people's gathering and interpreting weather information to evaluate the risk
 - Seeking additional information is a decision!
- Decision to shelter
 - Vast majority of people (survivors and victims)
 who received warning heeded it and sought
 shelter in best location available to them
 - BUT ... less than half of people had a basement, storm cellar, or safe room to shelter in
 - Nearly 2/3 of victims were in mobile homes; additional 15 in houses, 4 in warehouse, 1 in vehicle

Julie's thoughts and questions

- Things I've learned
 - NWS, emergency managers, broadcasters are integrating information about who is at risk, where, when ... and this changes daily!
 - We are driven in our mission to save lives!
- Things I wonder and want to explore
 - Should mandatory protective action be taken at longer lead times (e.g., evacuating mobile home parks, dismissing classes, large-venue considerations)?
 - Should local, state, and federal governments partner (legislate?) to build local shelter facilities?

Daniel's thoughts and questions

- Things I've learned
 - We (the NWS and the "government" in general) want to help those who are asking about proper sheltering
 - We want proper shelters for all!
 - We can provide realistic, scientific data to event coordinators, engineers, etc. to help them with their decisions (is StormReady effective?)
- Things I wonder and want to explore
 - Polygons?
 - Probabilistic warnings?

Storm-based warnings




- Are they understood?
- Do the forecasters use them properly?
- Does the media handle them well?
- Does the public know if they are in the warning or not?
- Too large?
- Too small?
- Clearing?
- NWR ???
- Extensions?
- Verification?



Using technology wisely

 Technology is changing what information we provide and how, but this alone doesn't make us effective ... must realize and consider the societal impacts!



o "they" <u>understand</u> what w are trying to communicate ???

Moving forward...

- We know a little, but there is so much more we need to know. We have a LOT of questions!
- Need integrated physical and social science work
 - Many social science theories, methods, tools, and concepts to build off of in weather context
 - Need empirical information about people's knowledge, perceptions, decision-making
- *Ultimatesityoef isutoprousides decision-making

Acknowledgements

- Greg Carbin
- National Weather Service
- NCAR Societal Impacts Program (www.sip.ucar.edu)
- Super Tuesday service assessment team members
 - Mike Vescio (team leader) MIC, WFO Pendleton, OR
 - Kevin Barjenbruch WCM, WFO Salt Lake City, UT
 - Dennis Decker WCM, WFO Melbourne, FL
 - Alan Gerard MIC, WFO Jackson, MS
 - Jeff Orrock WCM, WFO Raleigh, NC
 - Steve Runnels WCM, WFO Springfield, MO
 - Jim Schmidt Emergency Manager, Butler County, KS
 - Ron Trumbla NOAA Public Affairs, Fort Worth, TX

Thank you!

- Contact
 - Julie Demuth (jdemuth@ucar.edu)
 - Daniel Nietfeld (dan.nietfeld@noaa.gov)
- Super Tuesday Tornado Outbreak of February 5-6, 2008, NWS Service Assessment Report (forthcoming)



